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During the final decades of the 20th Century, the countries in Southern 
Europe now belonging to the European Union (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece) 
have experienced dramatic changes in all the demographic variables. Until the 
seventies, their mortality had been clearly worse than the European average, while 
nowadays their inhabitants enjoy a life expectancy ranking among the world’s 
highest, especially for females. On the other hand, for centuries, the four countries 
had been the origin of substantial flows of outmigrants going mainly to the New 
World, while between World War II and the crisis of the seventies the migrants 
changed destinations and went in great numbers to prosperous European countries. 
After 1975, this also changed and Southern Europe progressively became a land 
of attraction: migratory flows reversed, former migrants returned home and 
increasing flows of non-European migrants started changing the human landscape 
of these societies of highly homogeneous ethnicity. 
No matter how important the changes in mortality or in migration may 
have been, it is not because of them that Southern Europe is now under the 
microscope of demographers, but because of the sharp decline in fertility 
experienced during the seventies, the extremely low levels attained and the length 
of time these levels have prevailed. In fact, never has such a large region, with a 
population of over 120 millions, experienced such a low fertility for more than 
two decades. Recently, some new regions seem to be following in the steps of 
Southern Europe, such as countries in Eastern Europe, in former USSR and in 
Eastern and Southeast Asia. Some of them even show rates below the present data 
for Southern Europe and keep decreasing. Nevertheless, Southern Europe still 
holds the title for being considered the classical case in the study of what some 
authors call lowest low fertility, defined by a Total Fertility Rate under 1.3.  
Among the four countries considered, Spain offers the most extreme 
example. As shown in Figure 1, comparing fertility levels, Spain’s TFR amounted 
2.8 to 3 children per woman throughout the period 1960-1975, well above the 
European average and substantially higher than the Italian and Greek fertility rates. 
Two decades later, in 1995, the TFR in Spain was 1.16, the lowest in the world 
that year as happened repeatedly during the nineties. Therefore, the decline of 
fertility in Spain was the sharpest and the level reached the lowest ever. 
From here on, to avoid getting lost in comparisons of cases that are really 
quite similar, only the case of Spain will be presented. In most aspects, though, 
the facts and factors mentioned for Spain might be generalised to the other three 
























1.The case of Spain: the facts 
 
  Circa 1900, life expectancy in Spain was less than 35 years (33,7 for males, 
35,1 for females) which meant a negative difference of around 15 years with 
respect to Western European average. In contrast, in 1999, Spanish women had a 
life span of 82.1 years and Spanish men of 75.1; only Japan (84.0 and 77.1) and 
Switzerland (82.5 and 76.8) showed better figures for both sexes at the same time. 
(See Figure 2) 
 











































  In the same year 1999, the TFR in Spain was 1.20. Only Latvia (1.18), 
Russia (1.17), the Czech Republic (1.13) and Ukraine (1.10) had lower levels. By 
contrast, in 1975 the Spanish TFR (2.9) had been one of the highest in Europe. 
The variations on the completed fertility of cohorts is somewhat smaller but still 
very considerable (See Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3. Cohort Completed Fertility and  

















Source: Cabré, A., Domingo, A., and Menacho, T. (2002), INE. 
 
  The coincidence of both these processes, large gains in life expectancy and 
a sharp decrease in fertility, caused a dramatic change in the age-structure of the 
population, as appears in the comparisons between the Spanish age-pyramids for 
1975 and 1996 (Figures 4 and 5). The most interesting aspects of the 
transformation in the age structure are those concerning the aged population and 
those concerning children and young adults. The first aspect is common to many 
countries, but the second is hard to find outside Southern Europe and reflects the 
depth and speed of fertility decline, since the 1996 cohort is roughly half the size 
of the 1975 cohort. In summary, during the last twenty years, the Spanish age 
structure has been characterised by an ever-decreasing proportion of children 
under 15 and an ever-increasing proportion of youths and young adults, since one 
fourth of the present population was born between 1962 and 1977.  This fact is 
probably one of the main factors to be taken into account when searching for 





















































Source: Spanish Census 
 
 















Source: Spanish Census 
 
 
  The sharp contrast between larger cohorts, born in the sixties and seventies, 
and smaller cohorts, born in the eighties and nineties, can be considered as the 
translation, in human figures, of the sharp contrast in behaviour related to family 
formation in the two periods, both being equally exceptional but in opposite 
senses. They are exceptional in two contrasting, and probably related, ways: the 
level of nuptiality and the timing of all the steps in family formation.  
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  Differences in timing appear technically obvious when observing Figure 3, 
which shows how along the 20th century period fertility rates and completed 
fertility of cohorts followed coincident trends only until 1950 and cohorts 1921-
1925. As was pointed out above, after 1950 fluctuations in period indicators seem 
to have been significatively larger than those in the completed fertility of cohorts. 
In figures, TFR ranges from 2.93 in 1965 to 1.16 in 1996, while completed 
fertility ranges only from 2.71 children in cohorts 1931-1935 to an estimated 1.5-
1.6 children in cohorts born after 1961. The larger fluctuations of the period 
indicators is consistent with the fact that mean age at motherhood went down 
from 30.7 years in 1950 to 28.2 in 1980 and up to 30.7 years again in 1999. In the 
cohorts, mean age at motherhood went from 30.4 years for women born in 1926-
1930 to 26.95 years for those born in 1951-1955. It is expected to exceed 30 years 
again for cohorts born after 1961 (See Figure 6). 
 
 
















Source: Cabré, A., Domingo, A., and Menacho, T. (2002), INE. 
 
It is interesting to observe that fluctuations in timing are shorter and deeper 
than those in periods, which is the opposite of what was observed in fertility 
levels. So, it could be concluded that a non negligible part of the fertility decline 
registered through the years is the result of changes in biographic time, which in 
itself should have, in a low fertility regime, only a small effect on the final 
number of children being born to a woman. The effects on the births occurring in 
a specific year or period may however be very important when the fluctuations in 
timing are as deep as they have been in Spain. In summary: many births which 
would normally have occurred in the eighties and nineties, had there been no 
changes in timing after 1950, in fact took place in the sixties and seventies or 
presumably were delayed until the present 21st century, causing a 
disproportionate  period fertility decline, as there had been a dispropotioned 
































  Besides timing, or perhaps it should be said associated with timing, there is 
nuptiality, measured in both age at marriage and frequency of first marriage. In 
the first place, there is an obvious association between age at marriage and age at 
motherhood, and since delay in motherhood depresses period fertility, there 
should be a negative association between increasing age at marriage and period 
fertility levels.  
 
Figure 7. Female Mean Age at First Marriage and  















Source: processed by the author form INE (2001). 
 
As to the effects of the level of nuptiality, Spanish data for the 20th 
Century show a very strong positive relationship between frequency of first 
marriage and completed fertility of cohorts: women born from 1931 to 1940, who 
had a fertility appreciably higher than those preceding them, remained unmarried 
at 50 in less than 6.5% of cases, while more than 14% of those born before 1920 
never married. Calculations made by the author for the region of Catalonia, which 
experienced an early fertility transition in the 19th century, showed that for the 60 
cohorts born before 1960 differences in fertility were explained mainly the 
proportion of ever-married women and their age at marriage, leaving little room 
for marital fertility differences. With reference to Spain, the data presented here 
has concerned only general fertility. There is no doubt that the fluctuations would 
be much smaller if we had been dealing with completed fertility for marriage 
cohorts.  
As for the more recent generations, it is difficult to predict now what 
proportion of women born after 1960 are going to remain permanently single, 
especially if we take into account consensual unions, less extensive in Spain than 
in other European countries but still increasingly common. In any case, given the 
data we already have (see Figures 8 and 9), we can state that their nuptiality is 
either going to be lower or occur at a much older age. The negative effect on 
fertility would be higher in the first case but might be non-negligible in the second, 
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Source: Processed by Miret, P. from INE. 
 
 















Source: Processed by Miret, P. from INE. 
 
 
According to the present analysis, marital fertility would come only third 
in order of factors, after timing and nuptiality, and not first as it is often 
conceptualised by those stating that "couples do not have as many children as they 
used to". Nevertheless, the factor is obviously relevant. Raw data show that first 
births have only experienced a maximum reduction of 31% (from 260.300 in 1976 
to 180.369 in 1996), while fourth births have decreased constantly and quite 
regularly, experiencing a reduction of 87% in only twenty five years between 























As has been pointed out by authors of theories on Second Demographic 
Transition, one of the characteristics of the new situation in low fertility countries 
is the absence of significant differences between regions or social classes. This is 
also true in Spain. The trends in fertility and its components that have been 
discussed here are common to most regions: all of them have experienced 
dramatic declines and delaying. As it appears in Figure 10, showing TFR values 
for the Spanish Regions (Comunidades Autónomas) in 1975-1999 and 1995-1999, 
all regions in the first period had a TFR ranging between 2.20 and 3.30 children, 
while in the more recent period all regions had a TFR ranging from 0.7 to 1.7 
children. Southern regions have higher levels in both periods, but regional 
differences appear as much smaller than temporal ones. It is, by the way, amazing 
to realise that no region, in any period, is located in the interval of values 
including the mythical 2.1 children per women. They move either above or below, 
and quite far away from it in most cases.  
With respect to age at motherhood, the findings are quite similar (see 
Figure 11). While in 1975-1979 all regions had a mean age at motherhood ranging 
from 27.5 to 30 years, in 1995-1999 all of them ranged from 29 to 31.7 years. In 
this case, there is not a clear pattern in regional differences holding through time. 
The Eastern region of Valencia, the only one staying within the same range at 
both points in time, figures among those with a younger age, the opposite of what 
happened twenty years before. 
 
 





























2.70 to 3.30 
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Source: processed by the author from INE 
 
In conclusion, the analysis of data suggests that the decline of fertility in 
Spain during recent decades is certainly linked to the delaying of all the events 
relative to family formation and very probably generated, as well, by a lower 
propensity to marry and by a smaller final size of the family. The last two will 
have to be verified whenever the cohorts born after 1960 reach the end of their 
reproductive lives, which has yet to occur. Data show, also, that practically all 
regions have undergone similar declines and delays, even if substantial 
differences remain, mainly between South and North. 
 
2. The case of Spain: the factors 
 
There is a large amount of theoretical work already done and now in 
progress aiming to establish the causes of the changes in timing and propensities 
which underlie the fertility decline experienced by all developed countries in the 
last three decades. Therefore, if some of the short considerations which follow are 
original, many are not. They have in common, nevertheless, an original purpose: 
to have been thought specifically for the case of Spain with a predictive 
orientation in mind. 
I owe this summary of possible explanations to one of my students, who 
once told me: "you always have convincing explanations about low fertility, but 
they are never the same". He was right and his useful remark lead me to an 
exercise of listing all the explanations of low fertility and predictions on its future 
that I had proposed on different occasions and in different circumstances, and 
grouping and ordering them by families of thought, by their approaches, by their 
logics. This finally produced four types of approach centered on cycles, gender 
role transitions, growing life expectancy and geopolitics. 
The cyclical approach: fertility is low because of the low phase of a cycle. Still, 
1975-1979
1995-1999





31.00 to 31.70 
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there are several different kinds of cyclical logics. The economic logics: 
demographic behavior can be related to the economic situation, it depends, then 
on economic cycles, usually positively. The demographic logic: demographic 
behavior depends on age structure, on the relative weight of cohorts, population 
acting in a cyclical way on itself through the mediation of the labor market 
(classical Economy, Easterlin) or through the imbalances in marriage markets, the 
marriage squeeze (Cabré, 1993, 1994). In the first case, smaller cohorts have 
easier professional lifes, marry more and earlier and have more children and 
earlier than larger cohorts. In the second case, and because of universal younger 
age of brides, in decreasing cohorts women are scarce and have more 
opportunities to get well married and at younger ages. Their nuptiality and fertility 
are higher in relative terms. That explanation could be tested, for instance, against 
the historical experience of the long-lasting baby boom after World War II. The 
three kinds of cyclical explanation do not exclude each other, rather they are 
complementary. 
 
The gender transition approach: the passage from a model of male 
breadwinner/female housemaker (T.Parsons, P. McDonald) to an ideal model of 
equal spouses creates a transition period, shorter or longer, which is not propitious 
for family and fertility. On one side, the household is deserted by women but 
societies are not yet willing to provide the caring services necessary for children 
and dependents or to compensate the families for the income lost if one of its 
active members has to stay home. The cost of children increases greatly when the 
opportunity cost of the mother's labor is added to the direct cost of the child. On 
the other hand, during the transition period, women's entry into the labor market 
compensates for the low fertility and no scarcity of labor is experienced until the 
majority of women are in the labor force. Then, the need for workers is perceived 
again and society is ready to help families and invest resources in raising children. 
Fertility can go up again. That would explain why nowadays, contrary to what 
used to happen in previous periods, fertility keeps a direct relationship with 
female labor participation in developed countries. 
 
The growing life expectancy approach: longer life spans produce mainly old 
persons only in the short term and because of rigidities in age definitions. In the 
middle and long term, longer life spans produce as well an increasing number of 
socially young persons, since the biographical adjustement to the new 
expectancies delays all the entries into(and also the exits from) the different 
aspects of adult life and creates a new extended period in the life-cycle, young 
adulthood, which is mainly devoted to education and experimentation in 
professional opportunities. This period of life, scarcely autonomous from an 
economic point of view, is not usually covered by any generalized public system 
of income comparable to old-age pensions, and its costs are usually assumed by 
families of origin. Therefore, cost of (adult) children rises again and entry into a 
socially reproductive age is further delayed, for men and for women.  
Also, longer life spans increase the probability of families having four 
generations alive at once. In Spain, a half of those aged thirty have children, but  
11 
almost two thirds have at least one living grandparent. Therefore, wealth 
accumulated by the different generations of the same family generally increases 
but its generational transmission is delayed until older ages. This is another factor 
reducing the families' pressure on young persons to start new households. 
 
The geopolitical approach: Spain, like Italy, Portugal and Greece, was a less 
developed country in Europe which had the historical opportunity to become a 
member of the European Union and strive to move towards average Western and 
Northern European social and economic levels. For this purpose, labor had to be 
upgraded and the means to attain this goal were early retirement for the older 
cohorts, whose abilities were too obsolete, and some kind of over-education for 
the young. Public and private investment in human resources went towards 
educating the very large cohorts of young men and women born during the sixties 
and the seventies rather than helping and pushing these same men and women to 
give birth to new individuals. 
Finally, investment in education of the young gives the new generations 
professional abilities and expectations which keep them away from less qualified 
and badly paid jobs, leaving the space in the labor market for less exigent foreign 
migrants. Immigration then becomes a permanent structural feature of the 





From the point of view of these different approaches, what is the situation 
of Spain at the end of 2002 and what can we expect with respect to future fertility 
trends? 
The cyclical approach suggests that small cohorts have already been 
entering the labor market for several years and that decreasing cohorts are 
approaching the age of full nuptiality. Both factors should have positive effects on 
fertility. It is more difficult to predict the economic cycle and its effects on 
demographic behavior. In any case, the increase of demand generated by the 
creation of new households has to act positively on economic activity. 
The gender approach suggests that gender equality of opportunities in 
Spain has progressed considerably over the recent years, particularly for new 
cohorts of adults, and reminds us that the labor participation of women aged 25-34 
now exceeds the average European level. In recent years, the increase in fertility 
levels has been much higher in places where female labor participation rates are 
higher, such as the region of Madrid which had a TFR of 1,41 in 2001. Therefore, 
the gender role transition is quite well advanced and its effects on fertility should 
now be positive. 
From the point of view of life expectancy, no reversal of the process of 
adaptation to longer live spans is in sight. So, this factor is going to restrain in 
some way the trends towards younger transition to adulthood caused by the above 
mentioned factors. 
Finally, from the geopolitical point of view, the aim of convergence with  
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European levels of affluence which lead to the relative over-education of the 
young has been practically attained. The number of young persons is decreasing 
and their employment is now higher. More resources can now be devoted to 
helping families with children and policies in this direction are being promoted. 
So, fertility should expand because of this reason. 
 On the other side, considering the increasing participation of migrants in 
the labor force, we could expect a lower demand for the reproduction of the native 
population, which would act to keep fertility low. But at the same time, migrants 
are usually young persons of full reproductive age and their fertility is higher on 
average, so that this factor tends to over-compensate for the former one. 
Using the light shed by each of the four angles of our perspective, during 
the first decade of the 21st century the Spanish population should regain 
progressively but consistently higher fertility levels, converging also in the 
demographic field with average European standards and leaving behind the times 
of lowest low fertility. 
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